Universal human rights and particular cultural identities, which are relativistic by nature, seem to stand in conflict with each other. It is commonly suggested that the relativistic natures of cultural identities undermine universal human rights and that human rights might compromise particular cultural identities in a globalised world. This article examines this supposed clash and suggests that it is possible to frame a human rights approach in such a way that it becomes the starting point and constraining framework for all non-deficient cultural identities. In other words, it is possible to depict human rights in a culturally sensitive way so that universal human rights can meet the demands of a moderate version of meta-ethical relativism which acknowledges a small universal core of objectively true or false moral statements and avers that, beyond that small core, all other moral statements are neither objectively true nor false.
INTRODUCTION
In this article, I attempt to depict the complex relation between human rights and cultural identity against the background of the so-called dichotomy between Western and non-Western cultural norms and values. The supposed tension between the universal demand of human rights, on one hand, and the relativistic nature of cultural identity on the other hand seems to undermine the possibility of a peaceful encounter between human rights and cultural identity in a globalised world. Many laypeople and scholars alike believe that the Western concept of human rights compromises, at least to some extent, the ways in which some nonWesterners conceive their own particular and valuable cultural features and lifestyles. Therefore, it is assumed that the influence of human rights on nonWestern cultures jeopardises the cultural identities of people living in non-Western settings. 1 The first two main sections of this article briefly introduce the notions of human rights and cultural identity, respectively; the third part describes the clash between different cultural identities by appealing to some vital cases in the context of ethics, bioethics and politics. I then conclude by proposing a means of resolving these clashes, or what I call a "moderate" approach to culturally sensitive human rights that pays close attention to both perspectives.
HUMAN RIGHTS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
What is a human right? At first sight, this question seems rather simple. But when we look more closely, we find that trying to answer this question properly causes one to confront a great complexity of vital ontological, epistemic, justificatory and moral issues concerning the notion of human rights. 2 Of course, it
is not possible to cover in a short essay the full range of issues entailed in the philosophy of human rights. Rather, I will start from generally uncontroversial assumptions about human rights and will then focus on the complex relation between human rights and cultural identity.
According to most scholars in the field, human rights are primarily moral rights of high priority that are universally valid, independent of any legal recognition by particular nation-states or of particular times and places. All human beings are endowed with these rights simply by virtue of their humanity. In this 1 For example, Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, "Human Rights: A Western Concept with Limited Applicability": 1; in: Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, eds., Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1979). 2 John-Stewart Gordon, "Human Rights"; in: Duncan Pritchard, ed., Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy (published online, 2015).
These established provisions can be used to help in solving ethical conflicts on the international or national level.
(c) Universality
The universality of human rights facilitates the establishment of universal moral norms for analysing and responding to cultural challenges. A global ethics necessarily needs to appeal to a (minimal) universal standard, or lingua franca, in order to solve cross-cultural problems.
(d) Relation of rights and health
There is a close relationship between biomedicine and the most basic human rights such as the right to life, the right to physical integrity, and the right to healthcare and to healthcare resources. 19 This consideration becomes particularly relevant when we consider the potential collision between human rights and certain cultural practices, such as female genital circumcision. 16 See John-Stewart Gordon, "Human rights in bioethics: theoretical and applied," 
WHAT IS CULTURAL IDENTITY?
The notion of cultural identity is complex and opaque. In this section I attempt to flesh out a common-sense meaning of the term. Let us first begin by considering what identity means before we move on to examine the notion of cultural identity. In the context of individuals and groups of people, the term identity usually denotes particular traits or properties that are characteristic of the self-conception of those individuals or groups. Such traits as language, religion, education, social status, ethnicity and gender are important factors in both one's own self-conception and how other people see us. Thus, to acknowledge one's own identity presupposes at least two different perspectives. The first perspective is the individual self that is constituted by self-reference, and the second perspective is the confrontation with others that makes it, in general, possible for us to see ourselves as distinct entities in the first place. It seems clear that each individual self is not isolated (i.e. none of us is an island) but, rather, interacts with the social or collective self, and furthermore that the self is deeply embedded in a social setting that strongly contributes to the self-perception of each individual. Whether this phenomenon-that we perceive ourselves partly by reference to the social setting around us-is a good or a bad thing is another issue entirely.
CULTURAL IDENTITY
The concept of cultural identity, then, can be understood as an institutionalised and, more or less, unified vision or worldview as to how people at a certain particular place and time in history should live together, one that can be clearly distinguished from other ways of living. Cultural identity is necessarily bound to a social group and a certain particular place, such as a nation-state (e.g.
Ukraine) or a particular region within a nation-state (e.g. Crimea). In addition, it typically comprises vital traits, such as a shared language, place of residence, religion, values and traditions, and often ethnicity as important means of defining the particular cultural identity. However, my contention at this point is not that cultural identities are always and completely determined by these factors, but rather that such aspects are commonly seen as relevant in describing the notion of cultural identity. Individuals who view themselves as members of a particular cultural identity are not thereby required to comply with every defining aspect of that identity; they may actually share only parts of it. In other words, cultural identities are not necessarily homogeneous but can also be heterogeneous by nature; in fact, the latter seems to be the rule and not the exception. against people believed to be of foreign background). Admittedly, these incidents do not prove that a deep-rooted clash of civilisations is occurring, but they do indicate that many fear the social and economic consequences of mass migration and are seduced by nationalist rhetoric that plays on these popular fears.
THE CLASH OF CULTURAL IDENTITIES
Let us now turn to real-life clashes between cultural identities. I will begin by briefly describing five paradigmatic cases to highlight some problems concerning the relations between different cultural identities. These thought-provoking examples not only show the obvious, namely that different cultural identities may clash, but also are evaluated against the background of human rights, which are the starting point and constraining framework of all non-deficient cultural identities.
To define this concept: deficient cultural identities are, by virtue of their very nature, completely incompatible with the human rights agenda. For example, the so-called Pirate's Creed of Ethics was the "moral" code of an organization of low and deceitful people whose main business was to rob, to murder, to gain profit by illegal means, and to set their members free from any other social, political, and moral standards of a given community. By way of comparison, a particular cultural identity might contain immoral features from a human rights perspective -for example, it might forcefully advocate female genital circumcision -but might still be considered a non-deficient cultural identity since, overall, it is still compatible 23 with the human rights agenda, which can be seen as the gold standard for evaluating the clashes between different cultural identities (as further discussed below). performance of religious duties, promoting group identity, cleanliness and health, preserving virginity (i.e. to protect the family's honour), promoting monogamy and increasing the sexual pleasure of men. On the other hand, proponents of the human rights agenda claim that female genital circumcision can cause serious harm and hence is a violation of the human right not to be harmed. The immediate health-related problems resulting from female circumcision include death, infection, 24 There are three main types of female genital circumcision. The first type involves removal of the clitoris foreskin, the second entails full removal of the inner labia, and the third includes full removal of the clitoris, the inner labia, parts of the labia majora, and the clitoris foreskin. All three forms are common. 
FIVE CASES

SOME BRIEF OBSERVATIONS
What can we learn from the above-mentioned cases concerning, first, the relations between different cultural identities and, second, between human rights and (other) cultural identities? The cases reveal that different cultural identities 27 The key distinction seems to be between ethnic and ideologically motivated groups. The latter typegroups with a religious or political agenda-frequently do indeed wish to impose their worldview on others. The former sometimes do-resulting in serious ethnic conflict in such places as Serbia and Rwanda-but generally the minority group recognises that a peaceful coexistence is the best they can hope for. • Right to be free from slavery.
• Right of self-determination.
• Right of autonomy.
• Right to health and bodily integrity.
Female genital circumcision
Ukraine
• Respect for cultural minorities.
Sinti and Roma
• Right to equal education.
• Right to be free from discrimination.
Mass migration
• Right to freedom of movement.
In addition, the above-mentioned cases also illustrate the apparent clashes between the overarching human rights agenda and some cultural identities, not simply clashes between different cultural identities. 
CULTURALLY SENSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS: A MODERATE APPROACH
THREE TYPES OF MORAL RELATIVISM 30
It is common to distinguish three types of moral relativism: descriptive or cultural relativism, meta-ethical relativism, and normative (moral) relativism. I will describe each of these three concepts previously to provide a basis for the subsequent analysis. Until the right to culture is understood to be a basic human right, individuals will continue to be told that they must become assimilated, that their background is 'irrelevant,' and that there is only one correct way to behave. In a culturally diverse society, it is necessary that individuals be permitted to pursue their own life plans without interference from the government. Unless the cultural traditions at issue involve irreparable harm, they should be allowed" (Alison Dundes Renteln, supra note 28, 219 Proponents of universal human rights contend that cultural identities differ in their moral status depending on how they treat their own members and nonmembers, animals, and nature. From this perspective, it does make a moral difference whether a group of people experiences discrimination due to contingent facts such as gender, ethnicity and impairment. It does make a moral difference whether women are forced to have their genitals circumcised so that they can meet the social standards of a male-centred society, thereby exposing themselves to a dubious and severely harmful practice. And it does make a moral difference whether a society enslaves some of its people or whether all citizens are entitled to live freely in peace and harmony.
The human rights agenda sets a minimal universal standard as to how all people should treat each other, namely in a respectable, fair and equal way.
Whether this way of articulating human rights originated in the West is of no relevance. Had they been discovered by any non-Western culture, they would be just as true and reasonable as they are now. All cultural identities must be evaluated by the human rights agenda. As Figure 1 applicable to all persons in all places, and we rightly judge all human conduct by its standards" 41 The very idea of seeing the human rights agenda as the foundation of all cultural identities goes back to Beauchamp and Childress's understanding of a common morality. Likewise, universal human rights (as a basic cultural identity),
are not merely one cultural identity in competition with others; rather, they embody an overarching set of principles and the gold standard against which all cultural identities are judged.
How would the methods of specification and balancing work in cases where human rights and cultural identities clash? How should these rather broad and sometimes discordant concepts be reconciled so as to pay proper respect to both notions? The above-mentioned, rather theoretical considerations can be illustrated by the case of female genital circumcision, which was briefly discussed above. For the sake of argument, let us assume that female genital circumcision fulfils some important societal needs that have been passed on from one generation to another.
Perhaps it (a) serves as an important initiation ceremony marking the point at which girls become women (which is commonly seen as indispensable among many 37 with respect to the moderate approach.
(a) The principle of autonomy
The principle of autonomy is cited by both sides, i.e. proponents and critics of female genital circumcision. However, they articulate this universal principle in very different ways. Westerners tend to specify the principle of autonomy in mainly individualistic terms, whereas many communities in which female genital circumcision is practised adhere to a family-oriented understanding of the concept. 
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It is a justified expression because the demands of both sensitivity to a given cultural identity and human rights are met sufficiently. The overall idea, however, is not that we are supposed to fully understand and appreciate the meaning of every social institution of a given cultural identity, but that we should respect all cultural identities that are in accord with the human rights agenda, regardless of our own particular worldview.
CONCLUSIONS
As elucidated above, the moderate approach to universal human rights is compatible with the moderate version of meta-ethical relativism, the idea that there exists a small universal core of objectively true or false moral statements. This small and universal core is the starting point and constraining framework for all non-deficient cultural identities. The human rights agenda forms the very foundation of an ideal just society. This article did not deal with the question of the justification of specific human rights as such; that would have been a different project. Rather, it promoted a conception of universal human rights by which all cultural identities can and should be evaluated. The further development of culturally sensitive human rights is an on-going and demanding project that requires careful attention, as well as continuous respect for others, in order to become a global success story.
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